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Recent years have witnessed the emergence of powerful new tools for assaying the
brain and a remarkable acceleration of research focused on the interplay of emotion and
cognition.This work has begun to yield new insights into fundamental questions about the
nature of the mind and important clues about the origins of mental illness. In particular,
this research demonstrates that stress, anxiety, and other kinds of emotion can profoundly
inﬂuence key elements of cognition, including selective attention, working memory, and
cognitive control. Often, this inﬂuence persists beyond the duration of transient emotional
challenges, partially reﬂecting the slower molecular dynamics of catecholamine and hor-
monal neurochemistry. In turn, circuits involved in attention, executive control, and working
memory contribute to the regulation of emotion. The distinction between the ‘emotional’
and the ‘cognitive’ brain is fuzzy and context-dependent. Indeed, there is compelling
evidence that brain territories and psychological processes commonly associated with
cognition, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and working memory, play a central
role in emotion. Furthermore, putatively emotional and cognitive regions inﬂuence one
another via a complex web of connections in ways that jointly contribute to adaptive
and maladaptive behavior. This work demonstrates that emotion and cognition are deeply
interwoven in the fabric of the brain, suggesting that widely held beliefs about the key
constituents of ‘the emotional brain’ and ‘the cognitive brain’ are fundamentally ﬂawed.We
conclude by outlining several strategies for enhancing future research. Developing a deeper
understanding of the emotional-cognitive brain is important, not just for understanding the
mind but also for elucidating the root causes of its disorders.
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Until the 20th century, the study of emotion and cognition was
largely a philosophical matter. Although modern perspectives on
the mind and its disorders remain heavily inﬂuenced by the intro-
spective measures that deﬁned this earlier era of scholarship, the
last several decades have witnessed the emergence of powerful
new tools for assaying the brain and a remarkable acceleration
of research to elucidate the interplay of emotion and cognition
(Pessoa, 2013; Braver et al., 2014; Dolcos and Denkova, 2014).
The immediate goal of our Special Research Topic was to survey
recent advances in understanding how emotional and cognitive
processes interact, how they are integrated in the brain, and the
implications for understanding the mind and its disorders (Okon-
Singer et al., 2014b; Figure 1). Here, we consider ways in which
this rapidly growing body of work begins to address some more
fundamental questions about the nature of cognition–emotion
interactions, highlighting key points of consensus. By focusing
attention on the most important outstanding questions, we hope
to move the ﬁeld forward. First, we hope that answers provided
by our contributors will stimulate discussion. Second, we hope
that juxtaposing clear theoretical goals against the current state
of the science will motivate new and impactful research. Clearly,
our understanding of emotion–cognition interactions remains far
from complete. Indeed,we are reminded of Ekman andDavidson’s
comment: “There are many promising ﬁndings, many more leads,
[and] a variety of theoretical stances”(Ekman andDavidson, 1994,
p. 3). We conclude by outlining several strategies for enhancing
future research. With continuing effort, some of the fundamental
questions will be decisively addressed. In some cases, the ques-
tions themselves will evolve, as in other areas of the biological
sciences.
HOW DOES EMOTION INFLUENCE COGNITION?
Many of our contributors highlighted evidence that the perception
of emotionally-salient stimuli and the experience of emotional
states can profoundly alter cognition.
EMOTIONAL CUES GRAB EXOGENOUS ATTENTION AND MODULATE
ENDOGENOUS ATTENTION
There is abundant evidence that emotionally-salient cues—
snakes, spiders, and angry faces—strongly inﬂuence attention
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FIGURE 1 |The top 200 scientific terms used in the Special ResearchTopic.The typeface is scaled proportional to the frequency of each term. The ﬁgure
was generated using http://www.wordle.net.
(e.g., Siman-Tov et al., 2009; Lerner et al., 2012; Pour-
tois et al., 2013; Carretié, 2014) the ability to selectively
respond to relevant aspects of the environment while inhibit-
ing potential sources of distraction and competing courses
of action (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen,
2001). The focus of attention is determined by the perva-
sive competition between exogenous (often termed ‘stimulus-
driven’ or ‘bottom–up’) and endogenous (often termed ‘goal-
directed’ or ‘top–down’ attention) mechanisms (Egeth and Yantis,
1997).
With respect to exogenous attention, a number of contrib-
utors describe new evidence that emotionally-charged cues are
more attention-grabbing than neutral cues and highlight recent
efforts to specify the mechanisms underlying this bias (Holtmann
et al., 2013; McHugo et al., 2013; Peers et al., 2013; Stollstorff
et al., 2013). Along the way, McHugo et al. (2013) provide a
useful tutorial on methods for quantifying the capture of atten-
tion by emotional cues (e.g., dot-probe, emotional attentional
blink).
Importantly, attention can also be guided in an endogenous
fashion by internal goals (e.g., rules, instructions, and plans)
as well as moods and motivational states (e.g., feeling anx-
ious or hungry). Mohanty and Sussman (2013) discuss evidence
demonstrating that emotion and motivation can guide atten-
tion to congruent cues (e.g., food when hungry). In particular,
they show that subcortical regions proximally involved in deter-
mining value and orchestrating emotional states (e.g., amygdala,
substantia nigra) can facilitate endogenous attentional processes
implemented in frontoparietal regions and can strengthen activa-
tion in relevant sensory regions (e.g., face-selective regions of the
fusiform gyrus when anticipating an angry face). This extended
network, encompassing sensory, attentional, and emotional cir-
cuits, facilitates the rapid detection of emotionally-signiﬁcant
information.
ATTENTIONAL BIASES TO EMOTIONAL CUES ARE PLASTIC
Anxious individuals tend to allocate excess attention to threat and
there is evidence that this cognitive bias causally contributes to the
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007; Hakamata et al., 2010; MacLeod and Mathews, 2012;
Singer et al., 2012;VanBockstaele et al., 2013;MacLeod andClarke,
2015). Extreme anxiety and behavioral inhibition often emerges
early in development (Fox et al., 2005a; Blackford and Pine, 2012;
Fox andKalin, 2014), raising important questions about the degree
to which childhood attentional biases to threat are plastic and
can be inﬂuenced by early experience (Shechner et al., 2012; Bar-
HaimandPine, 2013; Henderson et al., 2014; MacLeod andClarke,
2015).
Here, Kessel et al. (2013) provide tantalizing correlative evi-
dence that emotional biases in attention are inﬂuenced by
caregiver style. Using an innovative combination of behavioral
and electrophysiological techniques, they show that although
temperamentally inhibited children allocate more attention to
aversive cues, this is reduced among the offspring of par-
ents who rely on encouragement, affection, and appreci-
ation to reinforce positive behavior. A key challenge for
future research will be to test whether targeted interven-
tions aimed at cultivating more salubrious parenting styles
have similar consequences. Prospective designs (e.g., before
and after exposure to a negative life event or trauma)
would provide another powerful approach for understand-
ing the plasticity of emotional attention (Admon et al., 2009,
2012).
EMOTION EXERTS PERSISTENT EFFECTS ON ATTENTION
Emotions are often conceptualized as ﬂeeting and most imaging
and psychophysiological studies of emotion focus on transient
responses to punctate emotional challenges. Yet, there is grow-
ing evidence that emotions can have lingering consequences for
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cognition and behavior (Davidson, 2004; Suls and Martin, 2005;
Hajcak and Olvet, 2008; Qin et al., 2009).
Here, for example, Vaisvaser et al. (2013) combined serial
measures of emotional state, neuroendocrine activity, and resting-
state brain activity to demonstrate that alterations in amygdala–
hippocampal functional connectivity persist for more than 2 h
following exposure to intense social stress. Along conceptually
similar lines, Morriss et al. (2013) use electrophysiological tech-
niques to show that endogenous attention is potentiated for several
seconds following brief emotional challenges (i.e., standardized
emotional images).
Several threads of evidence highlight the importance of under-
standing the mechanisms that govern variation in the speed
of recovery from emotional perturbation. In particular, indi-
vidual differences in emotional recovery (a) strongly predict
personality traits, such as neuroticism, that confer increased
risk of developing psychopathology (e.g., Blackford et al., 2009;
Schuyler et al., 2014); and (b) are sensitive to adversity and
chronic stress exposure, two other well-established risk fac-
tors (Lapate et al., 2014). An important challenge for future
research will be to identify the neural circuitry and molecu-
lar pathways that support the enduring effects of emotion on
endogenous attention and to clarify the intermediate processes
that link variation in emotional recovery to mental health and
disease.
DISTRACTING EMOTIONAL CUES READILY PENETRATE THE GATE
PROTECTING WORKING MEMORY
Endogenous attention is tightly linked with working memory
(Postle, 2006; D’Esposito and Postle, 2014; Sreenivasan et al.,
2014). The transient representation of task-sets, goals, and other
kinds of information in working memory plays a crucial role
in sustaining goal-directed attention and guiding behavior in
the face of potential distraction (Miller and Cohen, 2001). In
short, information held in working memory is a key deter-
minant of our momentary thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
Importantly, the capacity of working memory is strongly deter-
mined by the ability to ﬁlter or gate irrelevant information
(Vogel et al., 2005; McNab and Klingberg, 2007; Awh and Vogel,
2008).
Here, Stout et al. (2013) used a well-established electrophys-
iological marker of working memory storage (i.e., contralateral
delay activity; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004) to show that threat-
related distractors (i.e., task-irrelevant fearful faces) are stored
in working memory and that this ﬁltering inefﬁciency is exag-
gerated in dispositionally-anxious individuals. Once in working
memory, emotional information is poised to hijack endogenous
attention and other kinds of top–down controlmechanisms. From
a psychiatric perspective, this emotional gating deﬁcit may help
to explain the persistence of heightened negative affect (e.g., anxi-
ety, sadness) among patients with emotional disorders (Grupe and
Nitschke,2013; Cohen et al., 2014; Stout et al., 2014). An important
challenge for future studies will be to use hemodynamic imaging
techniques, such as fMRI, to clarify the neural circuitry underlying
emotional gating deﬁcits. A variety of evidence suggests that the
pulvinar may play an important role (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010;
Arend et al., 2014).
DISTRACTING EMOTIONAL CUES DISRUPT COGNITIVE CONTROL AND
WORKING MEMORY
Classically, cognition and emotion have been viewed as oppo-
sitional forces (Damasio, 2005a; Okon-Singer et al., 2007, 2011;
Shackman et al., in press). From this perspective, moods and
other kinds of emotional states are responsible for short-circuiting
cognition.
Consistent with this view, Kalanthroff et al. (2013) show that
emotional distractors disrupt cognitive control. Cognitive control
encompasses the range of processes (e.g., endogenous attention,
inhibition, and learning) that are engagedwhenhabitual responses
are not sufﬁcient to sustain goal-directed behavior, as in stop-
signal, go/no-go, Stroop, and Eriksen ﬂanker tasks (Shackman
et al., 2011b). Here, the authors demonstrate that the brief presen-
tationof emotional images disrupts performance in the stop-signal
task, awidely used indexof inhibitory control (see alsoPessoa et al.,
2012).
Likewise, Iordan et al. (2013) review evidence that emotional
distractors disrupt working memory. Converging with other work
focused on emotion-related distraction (Bishop, 2007; Etkin,
2012; Bishop and Forster, 2013; Etkin et al., 2013; Okon-Singer
et al., 2014a; van Ast et al., 2014), they suggest that degraded
performance reﬂects two processes: (a) increased engagement
of regions involved in processing socio-emotional information
and orchestrating emotional expressions (e.g., amygdala), and
(b) a reduction of delay-spanning activity in frontoparietal
cortex.
EMOTION STRENGTHENS SOME COGNITIVE PROCESSES WHILE
WEAKENING OTHERS
With the ascent of evolutionary theory in the 19th century (Dar-
win, 1872/2009, 1872), many scientists adopted the view that
emotions are functional and enhance ﬁtness (Susskind et al., 2008;
Todd et al., 2012; Sandi, 2013; Schwabe and Wolf, 2013; Todd
and Anderson, 2013); in short, that emotions are more adaptive
than not and “that there is typically more cooperation than strife”
between emotion and cognition (Levenson, 1994).
Consistent with this more nuanced perspective, the contribu-
tions from Clarke and Johnstone (2013), Morriss et al. (2013),
Robinson et al. (2013a, 2013b), Vytal et al. (2013) provide evi-
dence that experimentally-elicited anxiety facilitates some kinds
of information processing, while degrading others. In particular,
they provide considerable evidence that anxiety: (a) enhances vig-
ilance, potentiating early sensory cortical responses to innocuous
environmental stimuli, increasing the likelihood that emotionally
salient information will be detected; and (b) disrupts working
memory.
The molecular basis of emotion’s deleterious impact on work-
ing memory is reviewed by Shansky and Lipps (2013). Building
on pioneering work by Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic (1998) and
Arnsten (2009), the authors describe evidence that stress strongly
inﬂuences catecholamine (i.e., dopamine and norepinephrine)
and glucocorticoid levels in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in ways
that degrade delay-spanning neuronal activity.
Shansky and Lipps (2013) also describe important new evi-
dence that sex hormones, such as estrogen, can exacerbate the
impact of stress on prefrontal function. Along these lines, Sacher
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et al. (2013) review human imaging studies showing that the
structure and function of brain circuits involved in emotion gen-
eration and regulation are strongly and dynamically modulated
by cyclic ﬂuctuations in sex hormones (see also Sacher et al.,
2012). Taken together, these observations underscore the plastic-
ity of emotion–cognition interactions andprovide promising clues
about the origins of well-established sex differences in the preva-
lence of stress-related disorders, such as anxiety and depression
(Kessler et al., 2012; Kendler and Gardner, 2014).
EMOTIONAL STATES PROMOTE MOOD-CONGRUENT THOUGHTS AND
ACTIONS
Moods and other, more transient emotional states tend to
encourage congruent thoughts and actions (e.g., Lerner et al.,
2015), a process that is necessarily mediated by enduring
changes in brain activity and connectivity (cf. Vaisvaser et al.,
2013). Here, Van Dessel and Vogt (2012) demonstrate that
mood increases the amount of attention allocated to mood-
congruent cues. Schick et al. (2013) provide evidence that indi-
viduals at risk for developing depression interpret motivationally
ambiguous cues in a less positive light. Harlé et al. (2013)
describe a novel Bayesian computational framework for under-
standing the mechanisms underlying mood-congruency effects.
An important advantage of this framework is that it gener-
ates explicit mechanistic hypotheses. For example, the model
predicts that anxiety facilitates behavioral avoidance because
it leads to inﬂated expectations about the need for avoidant
behavior and increased expectations of punishment or error.
Furthermore, ﬁtting model parameters to observable behavior
affords an opportunity to identify the underlying determinants
of mood-congruency effects in healthy and clinical popula-
tions.
EMOTIONAL TRAITS INFLUENCE COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE, EVEN
WHEN EMOTIONAL CUES, AND CHALLENGES ARE ABSENT
Emotional traits are often conceptualized as diatheses for emo-
tional states (Matthews et al., 2009). Thus, individuals with high
levels of neuroticism or negative emotionality are thought to be
prone to exaggerated anxiety in the face of trait-relevant cues,
contexts, and challenges (e.g., punishment, negative feedback), as
illustrated in the contributions from Kessel et al. (2013), Moser
et al. (2013), and Proudﬁt et al. (2013). Yet, a considerable body
of neurophysiological evidence indicates that emotional traits
are embodied in the on-going activity and connectivity of the
brain (Canli et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2008; Shackman et al., 2009;
Rohr et al., 2013; Birn et al., 2014a,b). Likewise, the sustained
levels of heightened vigilance and distress characteristic of indi-
viduals with anxiety disorders are most apparent in the absence
of clear and imminent threat (Davis et al., 2010; Lissek, 2012;
Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). These observations raise the possibil-
ity that emotional traits could inﬂuence cognition in the absence
of explicit emotional distraction or challenge (Watson and Clark,
1984; Bolger and Schilling, 1991; Suls and Martin, 2005).
Here, Berggren et al. (2013) provide compelling evidence that
trait anxiety is associated with degraded cognitive control, indexed
using an anti-saccade task under load. This new observation
adds to a growing literature showing that “hot” emotional traits
can inﬂuence “cold” cognition (Shackman et al., 2006; Eysenck
et al., 2007; Bishop, 2009; Berggren and Derakshan, 2013, 2014;
Cavanagh andShackman,2014), a point thatwedevelopmore fully
in the subsequent section focused on the integration of emotion
and cognition.
HOW DOES EMOTION INFLUENCE EMOTION?
An important but rarely addressed question in psychology and
psychiatry concerns the potential inﬂuence of emotions on one
another and concomitant motivational states. For example, are we
less likely to experience excitement or joy on a day where we’re
feeling frazzled, depressed, or worn out (Arnsten, 1998, 2009;
Pizzagalli, 2014)?
EMOTION ALTERS REINFORCER SENSITIVITY
Building on earlier work by Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006),
Pizzagalli et al. (2007), Bogdan et al. (2010), and Berghorst et al.
(2013) demonstrate that experimentally-elicited anxiety selec-
tively reduces sensitivity to reward, suggesting a mechanism
that may contribute to the high rate of comorbidity between
anxiety and anhedonia (Southwick et al., 2005). Notably, this
effect was only observed in the subset of subjects who were
most responsive to the anxiety induction (i.e., threat of nox-
ious electric shock). Given evidence that many individuals will
never experience a mood or anxiety disorder (Kessler et al.,
2012), this paradigm may provide a means of identifying those
at greatest risk. Methodologically, this observation underscores
the necessity of including independent measures of emotion
in studies of emotion–cognition interactions (Shackman et al.,
2006).
HOW DOES COGNITION INFLUENCE AND REGULATE
EMOTION?
Humans frequently regulate their emotions and they do so using a
variety of implicit and explicit cognitive strategies (Gross, 1998a,b;
Gross and Thompson, 2007; Gross et al., 2011; Webb et al., 2012;
Okon-Singer et al., 2013). Implicit strategies are unintentional and
appear to occur without effort or insight. In contrast, explicit
strategies are voluntary and demand a degree of effortful control.
Several contributors to our Special Research Topic described
new insights into the mechanisms supporting the cognitive regu-
lation of emotion and the role of emotion regulation in psychiatric
disorders, such as depression.
ATTENTION REGULATES EMOTION
Perhaps the most basic strategy for reducing distress is attentional
avoidance; that is, to simply look away from the source of distress
(Xing and Isaacowitz, 2006). Overt attentional redeployment is a
potent means of regulating the engagement of subcortical struc-
tures, such as the amygdala, that play a key role in orchestrating
emotional states (Pessoa et al., 2002; Dalton et al., 2005; Dalton
et al., 2007; van Reekum et al., 2007; Urry, 2010; Okon-Singer
et al., 2014a).
Here, Aue et al. (2013b) employed an innovative combina-
tion of eyetracking, psychophysiology, and fMRI to explore
visual avoidance in spider phobics. Taking an individual differ-
ences approach, they demonstrate that enhanced activation in
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the amygdala and dorsal striatum to spider images was predictive
of increased visual avoidance among arachnophobes. Peripheral
measures of autonomic arousal showed a similar pattern, sug-
gesting that arachnophobes endogenously redirect attention as a
means of regulating their extreme fear, a strategy that might be
non-adaptive in the long term (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). A key
challenge for future research will be to clarify the order of these
effects (i.e., fear → attention avoidance → reduced fear), per-
haps by leveraging themillisecond temporal resolution afforded by
facial electromyography (e.g., Lee et al., 2009; Heller et al., 2014).
Elucidating the mechanisms supporting the recursive interplay
of emotion and attention and the mutual inﬂuences of different
processing biases (Aue et al., 2013a)would informourunderstand-
ing of disorders, like post-traumatic stress, that are characterized
by dysregulated emotion and aberrant attention to emotionally-
salient cues (e.g., Admon et al., 2013; Wald et al., 2013) and set
the stage for developing improved interventions (MacLeod and
Mathews, 2012; Bar-Haim and Pine, 2013; MacLeod and Clarke,
2015).
THE CHOICE OF COGNITIVE REGULATION STRATEGY DEPENDS ON THE
SITUATION
Sheppes and Levin (2013) emphasize that humans frequently use
effortful cognitive strategies to cope with and regulate their emo-
tions (e.g., Egloff et al., 2006; Ehring et al., 2010). For example,
they may try to distract themselves or they may try to reappraise
the situation in a more positive light. Sheppes and Levin (2013)
provide evidence that not only do individuals have the capacity
to ﬂexibly choose emotion regulation strategies, but that they do
so in ways that are strongly inﬂuenced by the emotional context
(e.g., choosing to reappraise when presented with mild nega-
tive pictures, and to distract themselves in face of highly aversive
stimulation).
WORKING MEMORY REGULATES EMOTION
Some strategies for regulating emotional distress, such as reap-
praisal, require the effortful maintenance of an explicit regulatory
goal. Rolls (2013) reviews evidence suggesting that this critically
depends onworkingmemory. More broadly, he suggests that goals,
attentional sets, and other kinds of declarative knowledge held in
working memory play a central role in regulating the output of
emotional systems.
HOW ARE EMOTION AND COGNITION INTEGRATED?
Humans tend to experience cognition and emotion as funda-
mentally different. Emotion is infused with feelings of plea-
sure or pain and manifests in readily discerned changes in
the body, whereas cognition often appears devoid of substan-
tial hedonic, motivational, or somatic features. These apparent
differences in phenomenological experience and peripheral phys-
iology led many classical scholars to treat emotion and cognition
as distinct mental faculties (de Sousa, 2014; Schmitter, 2014).
But contemporary theorists have increasingly rejected the claim
that emotion and cognition are categorically different (Dama-
sio, 2005b; Duncan and Barrett, 2007; Lindquist and Barrett,
2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013; Pessoa, 2013), motivated in
part by recent imaging evidence demonstrating the overlap of
emotional and cognitive processes in the brain (e.g., Shackman
et al., 2011b; Raz et al., 2012, 2014). The neural integration of
emotion and cognition should not be surprising—after all, the
human brain did not evolve to optimize performance on lab-
oratory measures of ‘cold’ cognition or to passively respond
to experimental manipulations of emotion, such as threat of
shock. Our brain, like that of other animals, is the product
of evolutionary pressures that demanded neural systems capa-
ble of using information about pleasure and pain, derived from
stimuli saturated with hedonic and motivational signiﬁcance,
to adaptively regulate attention, learning, somatic arousal, and
action.
A number of contributors highlighted advances in our under-
standing of the neural mechanisms that serve to integrate emotion
and cognition.
CANONICAL TERRITORIES OF THE ‘COGNITIVE’ BRAIN REGULATE
EMOTION
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is a canonically ‘cogni-
tive’ region of the brain, well known for its critical role in reasoning
and higher cognition (e.g., endogenous attention, working mem-
ory, and cognitive control; Roberts et al., 1998; Miller and Cohen,
2001; D’Esposito and Postle, 2014). Yet, there is growing evidence
that the dlPFC plays a key role in the top–down control of emo-
tion andmotivated behavior (Fox et al., 2005b; Koenigs et al., 2008;
Zaretsky et al., 2010; Buhle et al., 2013; Frank et al., 2014; Treadway
et al., 2014).
Here, Clarke and Johnstone (2013) and Iordan et al. (2013) pro-
vide tantalizing, albeit correlational, evidence that dlPFC acts to
protect the contents of working memory from emotional distrac-
tion. This converges withwork by Peers et al. (2013) and Stollstorff
et al. (2013) indicating that dlPFC plays a key role in regulating the
focus of attention in the face of potentially distracting emotional
cues.
Rolls (2013) extends this perspective to decision-making, argu-
ing that behavior reﬂects a pervasive, dynamic competition
between twokinds of brain systems: (a) emotional systems, includ-
ing circuits centered on the amygdala and ventral striatum, that
have been genetically programmed by our phylogenetic history
(e.g., fear elicited by danger, joy elicited by sweets and fat); and
(b) cognitive systems, such as the frontoparietal network, that are
informed by our ontogenetic history and governed by our declar-
ative knowledge and explicit goals (i.e., pick the healthy orange,
not the unhealthy candy bar; cf. Hare et al., 2008, 2009). Rolls
emphasizes that the lateral PFC can override the output of emo-
tion circuitry, biasing behavior in favor of our explicit goals. John
et al. (2013) articulate a complementary perspective, reviewing
evidence that the PFC and amygdala functionally interact via a
complex anatomical network of recurrent cortical and thalamic
projections and intra-amygdalarmicrocircuits (see also Pessoa and
Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa, 2012; Pessoa et al., 2012; Birn et al., 2014a,b;
Treadway et al., 2014).
Evidence linking the dlPFC to mood and anxiety disorders, as
in the papers contributed byCrocker et al. (2013) andWarren et al.
(2013), underscores the importance of developing a more sophis-
ticated understanding of the role played by ‘cognitive’ regions in
normal and disordered emotion.
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CANONICAL TERRITORIES OF THE ‘COGNITIVE’ BRAIN ARE REGULATED
BY EMOTION
Regulation is a two-way street. Just as ‘cognitive’ systems (e.g.,
dlPFC) regulate emotion, ‘emotion’ systems (e.g., amygdala) are
well positioned to regulate ‘cognitive’ systems via their inﬂu-
ence over the brainstem neurotransmitter systems that govern
the quality of information processing (e.g., neuronal signal-to-
noise) in cortical regions, as highlighted in the review contributed
by Shansky and Lipps (2013). Via these mechanisms, the amyg-
dala is endowed with the capacity to transiently assume enhanced
control over attention and behavior in situations that favor imme-
diate responses over slower, more deliberate reasoning (Davis and
Whalen, 2001; Arnsten, 2009).
ADAPTIVE AND MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR REFLECTS THE INTEGRATED
CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMOTION AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
Oftentimes, cognitive control is associated with laboratory tasks
that require the detection and adjudication of response conﬂict,
as with incongruent trials of the Stroop, Eriksen Flanker, and
go/no-go tasks. Yet, it is clear that control processes are engaged
by a much broader range of cognitive and emotional challenges
(e.g., Pochon et al., 2008; Shenhav et al., 2013). In particular,
control is engaged when there is uncertainty about the optimal
course of action (e.g., probabilistic learning), when potential
actions are associated with the possibility of error or punish-
ment, or when there is competition between alternative courses
of action (e.g., ﬂee/freeze, go/no-go). These features are hall-
marks of dangerous environments, both in the real world and
in laboratory studies of fear, anxiety, and pain. Consequently,
it has long been thought that control processes are engaged in
threatening environments in order to monitor risk, optimize
learning, and avoid potentially catastrophic actions (Norman and
Shallice, 1986; Gray and McNaughton, 2000). These theoretical
considerations raise the possibility that the neural circuitry under-
lying ‘cognitive’ control also contributes to the negative emotions
elicited by potential threat. Indeed, there is compelling evidence
from functional imaging studies that negative affect and cogni-
tive control paradigms consistently activate an overlapping region
of the midcingulate cortex (MCC; Shackman et al., 2011b; Lin
et al., 2014). This overlap is consistent with anatomical evidence
suggesting that the MCC represents a hub where information
about pain, threat, and other more abstract forms of potential
punishment and negative feedback are synthesized into a bias-
ing signal that modulates regions involved in expressing fear
and anxiety, executing goal-directed behaviors, and biasing the
focus of selective attention (Shackman et al., 2011b; Cavanagh
and Shackman, 2014). Taken together, these observations sug-
gest that anxiety and other emotions are tightly integrated with
control processes implemented in the MCC and other brain
regions.
Along these lines, Morrison et al. (2013) show that even sim-
ple, phylogenetically-ancient kinds of motivated behavior, such
as the reﬂexive withdrawal from pain or the learned avoidance
of pain-related contexts, are dynamically shaped by complex,
hierarchically-organized networks of feedforward and feedback
connections that serve to integrate ‘emotional’ (e.g., value, risk)
and ‘cognitive’ computations (e.g., prediction error, attention
allocation, action selection) in ways that support adaptive behav-
ior (for convergent perspectives, see the contributions from Rolls,
2013, and John et al., 2013).
Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) describe other evidence consis-
tent with this integrative perspective. In particular, they show that
‘cognitive’ conﬂict is aversive. This converges with a growing body
of evidence demonstrating that conﬂict and other prompts for
increased control (e.g., errors, punishment), are experienced as
unpleasant and facilitate avoidance (Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al.,
2010; Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012; Schouppe et al., 2012; Lind-
ström et al., 2013; Proudﬁt et al., 2013; Shenhav and Buckner,
2014).
If negative emotions are indeed integrated with control pro-
cesses, we would expect that anxiety and control should covary.
That is, one would expect a degree of functional convergence
between measures of anxiety and control-related activity in the
MCC or other regions (i.e., convergent validity; Campbell and
Fiske, 1959). Consistent with this possibility, Moser et al. (2013)
provide compelling meta-analytic evidence that error-related sig-
nals generated in the MCC are enhanced among anxiety patients
and individuals with heightened negative emotionality. This indi-
cates that negative emotionality, a fundamental dimension of
childhood temperament and adult personality (Caspi et al., 2005),
involves systematic differences in the way that the brain responds
to prompts for cognitive control.
McDermott et al. (2013) describe important new evidence,
gleaned from the study of Romanian orphans, that MCC con-
trol signals are plastic. In particular, they demonstrate that
MCC-generated control signals are profoundly shaped by early
experience in ways that confer risk or resilience for later socio-
emotional problems. This underscores the need to clarify the
neurodevelopmental mechanisms that serve to integrate emotion
and cognition in the laboratory and in daily life.
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY OF EMOTION AND
COGNITION: STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Despite substantial progress, a number of important questions
about the interaction of emotion and cognition remain unan-
swered. In this ﬁnal section, we highlight three strategies for
enhancing research in the cognitive-affective sciences (for more
general recommendations about best research practices, see
Button et al., 2013a,b,c; David et al., 2013; Chalmers et al., 2014;
Ioannidis et al., 2014a,b).
UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTIONAL-COGNITION
INTERACTIONS IN THE LABORATORY REQUIRES MORE SOPHISTICATED
MEASURES OF BEHAVIOR IN THE REAL WORLD
Most investigations of emotion, cognition, and their interplay
rely on a small number of well-controlled, but highly artiﬁcial
paradigms for manipulating emotion and cognition (e.g., static
aversive images and threat of shock to elicit anxiety; Coan and
Allen, 2007). Although these methods have afforded a number
of critical insights, their real-world signiﬁcance remains poorly
understood. For example, are attentional biases to threat, as
indexed by the dot-probe or other laboratory assays, predictive of
elevated behavioral inhibition or distress in daily life? Is amygdala
activation to fearful faces predictive of heightened social reticence
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or risk avoidance outside the scanner (see Admon et al., 2009
for preliminary afﬁrmative evidence)? Does the eliciting stimulus
(e.g., faces or aversive images) matter? Are measures of functional
connectivity or network-based metrics (e.g., node centrality; cf.
McMenamin et al., 2014) more predictive than regional activation
of behavior in the real world?
Given the limitations of ambulatory measures of brain
activity—there is no ‘fMRI helmet’ as yet—addressing these fun-
damental questions requires pairing assays of brain and behavior
obtained in the laboratory with measures of thoughts, feelings,
and behavior obtained in the ﬁeld. Recent work combining fMRI
with ecological momentary assessment (EMA) techniques, in
which surveys are repeatedly delivered to participants’ mobile
devices, highlights the value of this approach for identifying the
neural systems underlying naturalistic variation in mood and
behavior, a central goal of psychology, psychiatry, and the behav-
ioral neurosciences (Forbes et al., 2009; Berkman and Falk, 2013;
Lopez et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2014). The widespread dissem-
ination of smart phone technology affords additional, largely
unrealized opportunities for objectively and unobtrusively quan-
tifying daily behavior (e.g., assessments of activity and context
based on accelerometer and geographical positioning system data
(Gosling and Mason, 2015). In short, combining EMA with lab-
oratory assays provides a critical means of testing theoretical
validity and clinical relevance (e.g., does activation of the ven-
tral striatum support craving and approach?), a novel strategy for
assessing and dissociating the functional signiﬁcance of new assays
and derivative measures (e.g., functional connectivity between
the striatum and PFC), and an impetus for the development
of laboratory probes that more closely resemble the challenges
we routinely encounter in life (e.g., appetitive social cues and
temptations).
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY OF EMOTION AND COGNITION
REQUIRES A DYNAMIC NETWORK PERSPECTIVE
Emotion and cognition emerge from the dynamic interactions of
large-scale brain networks. Put simply, fear, joy, attention, working
memory, and other psychological constructs cannot be mapped to
isolated brain regions because no one region is both necessary and
sufﬁcient. Likewise, similar proﬁles of impairment can emerge
from damage to different regions located within in the same func-
tional network (Karnath andSmith,2014;Oler et al., in press). This
is not a newor contentious idea; pioneers likeMesulam,Goldman-
Rakic, and LeDoux highlighted the importance of distributed
neural circuits more than two decades ago and there is widespread
agreement amongst basic and translational researchers (Goldman-
Rakic, 1988; LeDoux, 1995; Mesulam, 1998; Bullmore and Sporns,
2012; LeDoux, 2012; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2012; Anticevic et al.,
2013).
Thus, understanding the interplay of emotion and cogni-
tion requires that we accelerate the transition from localiza-
tion strategies (i.e., mapping isolated brain structures to func-
tion; sometimes termed ‘neo-phrenology’) to a network-centered
approach. This will require harnessing the kinds of analytic
tools (e.g., functional connectivity ﬁngerprinting, graph-theoretic
and machine-learning approaches) that are necessary for elu-
cidating how adaptive and maladaptive behavior emerges from
functional coalitions of brain regions (Kinnison et al., 2012; Raz
et al., 2012, 2014; Anticevic et al., 2013; McMenamin et al., 2014;
Uddin et al., 2014). A key challenge for future research will
be to harness new techniques (e.g., EEG/fMRI fusions, slid-
ing window analyses of functional connectivity, EEG source
models of connectivity) for understanding how network activ-
ity dynamically changes across the broad range of time scales
on which emotion and cognition interact (Pessoa and Adolphs,
2010; Shackman et al., 2011a; Johnson et al., 2012; Raz et al., 2012,
2014).
Computationally explicit strategies (i.e., where quantitative
parameters of an abstract computational model are ﬁt to behav-
ioral or physiological measures), already common in the neuroe-
conomics literature, and information-based approaches, such as
multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA), that are increasingly com-
mon in the cognitive neuroscience literature, provide powerful
tools for discovering the functional signiﬁcance of regions and
networks associated with emotional and cognitive perturbations
and disorders (e.g., Hartley and Phelps, 2012; Montague et al.,
2012; Lewis-Peacock and Norman, 2013). For example, tradi-
tional univariate fMRI analyses use regression to predict the
activity of voxels, one-by-one, given some mental state (e.g.,
experiencing pain). While this strategy has proven enormously
generative, it does not provide strong evidence as to whether
overlapping patterns of fMRI activation (e.g., during physical
and social pain; Wager et al., 2013; Woo et al., 2014) reﬂect
the same mental representation. MVPA provides a means of
addressing this problem. MVPA classiﬁes mental states given a
pattern of activity across voxels; in effect, treating each voxel
as a weighted source of information about mental state. This
contributes to the identiﬁcation of the combinatorial code (i.e.,
pattern of activity across voxels) instantiating a particular men-
tal state (e.g., experiencing anxiety) and to test whether that
neural signature is reinstated at other times (e.g., performing a
cognitive control task), an essential step in elucidating the func-
tional contributions of territories that are commonly recruited by
cognitive and emotional challenges (e.g., dlPFC, MCC, anterior
insula).
Embracing a network perspective also reminds us that the func-
tional circuitry underlying the interplay of emotion and cognition
is likely to be complex and need not recapitulate the simpler pat-
tern of direct projections revealed by invasive anatomical tracing
techniques [cf. the contributions from John et al. (2013), Morri-
son et al. (2013), andRolls (2013)]. Indeed, there is ample evidence
of robust functional connectivity between brain regions that lack
direct structural connections and increasing evidence that reg-
ulatory signals can rapidly propagate across complex, indirect
pathways in ways that enable emotion (e.g., motivational salience
or value) to be integrated with perception and other kinds of
on-going information processing (Vincent et al., 2007; Ekstrom
et al., 2008; Honey et al., 2009; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Adachi
et al., 2012; Birn et al., 2014a). Deciphering the functional signiﬁ-
cance of this ‘connectomic’ complexity is likely to require more
advanced analytic approaches, such as probabilistic machine-
learning techniques (Murphy, 2012). The combination of ongoing
advances in computational methods as well as developments in
brain imaging acquisition techniques (e.g., those supported by
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the U.S. BRAIN initiative) will undoubtedly contribute to these
efforts.
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY OF EMOTION AND COGNITION
REQUIRES MECHANISTIC RESEARCH
Most of the contributors to the Special Research Topic used non-
invasive techniques, such as fMRI, to trace associations between
emotion and cognition, on the one hand, and brain function
on the other. Aside from unresolved questions about the ori-
gins and signiﬁcance of the measured signals (e.g., Logothetis,
2008), the most important limitation of these techniques is that
they do not address causation. A crucial challenge for future
studies is to develop a mechanistic understanding of the dis-
tributed networks that support the interplay of emotion and
cognition. This can be achieved by combining mechanistic tech-
niques (e.g., optogenetics) or invasive analyses of neuromolecular
pathways in animal models with the same whole-brain imaging
strategies routinely applied in humans (Borsook et al., 2006; Ler-
man et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2010, 2012; Lee et al., 2010; Desai
et al., 2011; Casey et al., 2013; Narayanan et al., 2013; Roseboom
et al., 2014). Similar strategies can be used with patients with
circumscribed brain damage (e.g., Nomura et al., 2010; Grat-
ton et al., 2012; Motzkin et al., 2014). Combining fMRI or EEG
withnon-invasive perturbation techniques (e.g., transcranialmag-
netic stimulation or transcranial direct current stimulation) or
pharmacological manipulations provides another opportunity for
understanding how regional changes in brain activity alter net-
work function and, ultimately, behavior (Paulus et al., 2005;
Guller et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Reinhart and Woodman,
2014). Prospective longitudinal designs represent another fruitful
approach to identifying candidate mechanisms, especially in rela-
tion to the development of neuropsychiatric disorders (Admon
et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
The last decade has witnessed an explosion of interest in the inter-
play of emotion and cognition. The research embodied in this
Special Research Topic highlights the tremendous advances that
have already been made. In particular, this work demonstrates
that emotional cues, emotional states, and emotional traits can
strongly inﬂuence key elements of on-going information process-
ing, including selective attention, working memory, and cognitive
control. Often, this inﬂuence persists beyond the duration of
transient emotional challenges, perhaps reﬂecting slower changes
in neurochemistry. In turn, circuits involved in attention and
working memory contribute to the voluntary regulation of emo-
tion. The distinction between the ‘emotional’ and the ‘cognitive’
brain is blurry and context-dependent. Indeed, there is com-
pelling evidence that territories (e.g., dlPFC, MCC) and processes
(e.g., working memory, cognitive control) conventionally associ-
ated with cognition play a central role in emotion. Furthermore,
putatively emotional and cognitive regions dynamically inﬂu-
ence one another via a complex web of recurrent, often indirect
anatomical connections in ways that jointly contribute to adap-
tive behavior. Collectively, these observations show that emotion
and cognition are deeply interwoven in the fabric of the brain,
suggesting that widely held beliefs about the key constituents of
‘the emotional brain’ and ‘the cognitive brain’ are fundamentally
ﬂawed.
Developing a deeper understanding will require a greater
emphasis on (a) assessing the real-world relevance of labora-
tory assays, including measures of brain activity; (b) a net-
work approach to characterizing the neurobiology of emotion–
cognition interactions, and (c) mechanistic research. Adopting
these strategies mandates collaboration among researchers from
different disciplines, with expertise in different species, popu-
lations, measurement tools, analytic strategies, and conceptual
approaches.
Addressing the interplay of emotion and cognition is amatter of
theoretical as well as practical importance. In particular, many of
themost common and costly neuropsychiatric disorders—anxiety,
depression, schizophrenia, substance abuse, chronic pain, autism,
and so on—involve prominent disturbances of cognition and
emotion (Millan, 2013). Fundamentally, they are disorders of the
emotional-cognitive brain. Collectively, these disorders far out-
strip the global burden of cancer or cardiovascular disease (Collins
et al., 2011; Whiteford et al., 2013; DiLuca and Olesen, 2014),
underscoring the importance of accelerating efforts to understand
the neural systems underlying the interaction and integration of
emotion and cognition.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS NOT DEFINED IN THE MAIN TEXT
Affect: The experience or expression of emotion (see also Barrett
et al., 2007).
Anxiety:A sustained state of heightened apprehension in response
to uncertain, distal, or diffuse threat (Davis et al., 2010).
Cognition: Cognition is a fuzzy category that conventionally
includes processes involved in knowing or ‘thinking,’ including
attention, imagination, language, learning, memory, and percep-
tion (for discussion, see Duncan and Barrett, 2007).
Emotion: Like ‘cognition,’ ‘emotion’ is a fuzzy, contentious cate-
gory that conventionally includes valenced processes (e.g., action
tendencies, attention, overt behavior, subjective feelings, and alter-
ations in peripheral physiology) that are triggered by speciﬁc
external or internal stimuli (e.g., actual or remembered threat for
fear); often taken to include states of anger, disgust, fear, happi-
ness, and sadness (e.g., Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Duncan and
Barrett, 2007; Gendron and Barrett, 2009; LeDoux, 2012, 2014).
Mood: A low-intensity emotional state that persists in the absence
of an explicit triggering stimulus (Ekman and Davidson, 1994).
Motivation: Internal states that are elicited by reinforcers and
serve to organize behavioral direction (i.e., approach or avoidance)
and intensity. Emotional states involve alterations in motivation
(e.g., increased avoidance in the case of fear). However, moti-
vation can be altered by homeostatic processes, such as hunger
and satiety, that are not conventionally considered emotional
(Rolls, 1999).
Neuroticism/Negative Emotionality: A fundamental dimension
of childhood temperament and adult personality; individuals with
high levels of Neuroticism/Negative Emotionality are susceptible
tomore intense or long-lastingnegative emotions, including anger,
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anxiety, fear, guilt, and sadness (Watson and Clark, 1984; Caspi
et al., 2005).
Reinforcer: Rewards and punishments; anything an organism will
work to approach or avoid (Rolls, 1999).
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